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Abstract. The covid19 pandemic is distinct from Spanish flu of 1918 from many aspects among 
which the contrast between the overabundance of worldwide exchange of information (infomedia) 
and the actual scarce knowledge of the pathogen and the infection mechanism. Another important 
distinction is that the epidemics threaten society components, social groups, communities and jobs in 
very different ways and different death tolls. With this in mind, we start with simple models of 
pandemics and we drive the reader to more complex models that take into accounts social 
compartments and communities. The discrete-state models are built by adding elements, first in a 
mean-field approximation, then adding age classes and differential contact rates, and finally inserting 
the social group dimension. The novel element we insert is the effect of restrictions in contacts and 
travels, filtered by the risk perception, according with the growth of the number of infected or 
recovered people. Assimilating risk perception with cognitive behavior, we obtain several coarse-
grain scenarios, that can be used for instance to calibrate the level of restrictions so not to exceed the 
capacity of the health system, and to speed the post-emergency recovery. 
 





1. Introduction   
 
   The COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). (1) The virus is most 
contagious during the first three days after symptom onset, although spread may 
be possible before symptoms appear and in later stages of the disease (2). Time 
from exposure to onset of symptoms is generally between two and fourteen days, 
with an average of five days (3). The infectivity of the virus is quite high, one 
person generally infects two to three others (4). At present there is no vaccine 
available.  
The infection’s outcome strongly depends on age. Toddlers and teenagers get 
easily infected but are almost 100% spared from the effects: they are 
asymptomatic; youngsters (up to 39 years old), could mistype it as common 
influenza. People in their forties, could find it an ultra-tough influenza. Older 
people may get pneumonia and could progress to multi organ failure (5) (6), 
especially in case of co-morbidity (7). Figure 1 shows a representative death toll   
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distribution by age. Due to the media coverage we may 
expect that the risk perception for the infection to follow 
closely this distribution. 
     There is also a substantial ethnic difference, not related to 
biological factors. For example, African Americans are 
dying in larger numbers than white people, particularly in 
many big USA cities as a result of differential access to 
medical care (for example mechanical ventilators). At the 
time of writing, it looks that the mortality is larger in those 
cities (and continents, such as Africa) with an overloaded 
health system or with very low density of ICUs (Intensive 
Care Units) as a result of decades of budget cuts or chronic 
lack of funding.  
    Many developed countries have population distribution 
largely skewed towards middle and older ages. From one 
side, older ages are correlated to higher probability of 
needing intensive cares, from the other middle and older ages 
need more frequently hospitalization in case of infection. The 
combined effects of these two factors, coupled to the limited 
number of hospital beds per capita results in severe 
limitations in handling the sudden spike in the number of 
COVID-19 hospitalization. The infection initial growth 
curves for several countries at the date of 12 April 2020 are 
shown in Fig. 2. 
     The curves are influenced by the social (contacts) and 
cognitive behaviors of the groups. For example, elderly 
people often live together in halls and special structures and 
may be exposed to higher probability of contagion, unless 
special precautions are observed. On the other hand, as we 
shall see in the following, individual behavior (protective 
habits, avoidance of contacts) can deeply influence the 
evolution of the disease. 
     The limited bed per capita capacity and the need for 
specialized nurses and doctors are significant drivers of the 
need to flatten the curve (to keep the speed at which new 
cases occur and thus the number of people sick at one point 
in time lower). One study in China found 5% were admitted 
to intensive care units, 2.3% needed mechanical support of 
ventilation, and 1.4% died (8).  
Around 20–30% of the people in hospital with pneumonia 
from COVID19 needed ICU care for respiratory support (9).  
The extensive sampling of Vo (10) shows that about 43% of 
infected people are asymptomatic and 17% needed ICU 
recovery.  
    It is noteworthy that the incubation period for COVID-19 
is typically five to six days but may range from two to 14 days. 
A fraction of 97.5% of people who develop symptoms will do 
so within 11.5 days of infection. This and the large number of 
asymptomatic infected make the counts of infected people 
extremely difficult. 
     The occurrence of the intergenerational caring and the 
need pf protecting middle-age and elder people has urged the 
adoption of lockdown practices, thus causing an immediate 
arrest of the economy and industrial activities. The crucial 
point for the human species to return to the past lifestyle and 
avoid millions of deaths is to flatten the curve of infection. 
Worldwide measures of restriction of contacts, which can take 
the form of compulsory or voluntary quarantine have been 
taken by national governs. The main criticism has focused on 
the rapid decay of national and world economies.  
Another important factor is the self-restraint and self-
quarantine, induced by the perception of risk of contracting 
the infection and/or of infecting others. It is noteworthy for 
instance that the first Chinese patients in the Spallanzani 
hospital in Rome (the 30th of January 2020) always wore their 
masks (also before showing any symptoms) and did not infect 
any other participant of their journey through Italy. Similarly, 
in spite of the huge return to their families in the South of Italy 
of people escaping from the forecasted quarantine in the North 
Italy (around the 21st of February 2020), very few cases 
appeared in the South, possibly due to a self-imposed 
quarantine, or at least to a careful obedience to imposed 
restrictions. Finally, the spreading of the virus in Lombardy is 
mainly due to the concentration of ill people in hospitals 
without the proper isolation, a fact that corresponds also to a 
huge infection rate and mortality among the local medical 
personnel.  
Figure 1. Case fatality rates by age group in China. Data 
through 11 February 2020. 
Figure 2. Number of confirmed cases aligned to the 1000th 
case (11). 
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    Models are needed to forecast the progression of the 
disease and the effects of countermeasures. Most models are 
based on continuous dynamics, i.e., mean-field, as described 
in the Section 2, with parameters adapted so to fit average 
data. However, such models cannot reproduce the sawtooth 
patterns seen in experimental data (see Fig. 3), and in general 
do not include the explicit dependence of restriction 
measures with the progression of the disease. In many cases 
indeed the patterns in Fig. 3 show a weekly oscillation, which 
however cannot be ascribed to insufficient data collection 
during weekends, since the oscillation are not so regular, they 
span several days and not just the weekend, and the 
subsequent peak (due to delayed report of data) are not 
evident. One possibility could be that data not 
collected/transmitted during weekends are incrementally 
passed to subsequent days till Friday, but it is improbable that 
this habit be so widespread in the world. Another possible 
factor is that there is a weekly contact pace, for instance due 
to work contacts, that diminishes during weekends and 
increases the infection rate during workdays. 
     In general, the simplest infection model says that the 
infection can stop only if the average number of new 
infections per each infectivity individual should be less than 
one. Given the bare infectivity probability 𝜏 (for the all 
duration of the infectivity period) and the average number of 
contacts ⟨𝑘⟩, in the absence of immune people, we have to 
reduce the product 𝜏⟨𝑘⟩ (better, 𝜏⟨𝑘2⟩/⟨𝑘⟩, which is 
generally similar to 𝜏⟨𝑘⟩ for uncorrelated networks (13)) to 
less than one. This can be done either using protective means 
(like masks, washing hands) which have the effect of 
reducing 𝜏, or isolation, i.e. reducing ⟨𝑘⟩.  
     In any case, the pre-pandemic high connectivity of humans 
(implying both the number of contacts and the mobility) 
constituted an important factor for the spreading of any 
disease. It can be shown that for scale-free networks (that 
show a diverging second moment of the connectivity) the 
epidemic threshold (the critical value of 𝜏) is zero, i.e., no 
epidemics can be stopped without restrictions to contacts (13). 
     The effects of the risk perception on the mitigation of an 
epidemics has been introduced in Ref. (14), and studied in 
Refs. (13) (15) (16) (See also Ref.(17)) and it has been shown 
that for networks with finite connectivity (and finite second 
moment of it), there is always a value of the perception able 
to stop the epidemics though self-restrictions, but for scale 
free networks, additional precautions has to be taken by hubs, 
i.e.,  people with high connectivity like physicians.  
     However, the other important ingredient is that the risk 
perception has to be really given by the actual community of 
real contacts. What happens is that the information contact 
network can be quite different from the real one (18), and 
clearly in this case one can either underestimate the risk,  as 
in Lombardy, or overestimate it, which is harmless unless the 
over-restrictions then lead to breakage of the norms.  
     Finally, data from China, Italy and France are best fit by a 
power-law (19), which is not consistent with the standard 
mean-field models. This ingredient can be inserted as a 
phenomenological factor in such models (20). 
     In this work we present some models incorporating the risk 
perception and/or the dependence of restriction measures on 
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Figure 3. Patterns of daily confirmed cases in different countries/regions starting from the 100thcase (12). Data retrieved the 29th May 
2020. The horizontal scale is in unit of 7 days to put into evidence the weekly oscillations. Notice that in many cases there in an evident 
effects of data collection, for instance in Chine there is a jump to 16,000 cases in one day (out of scale), and in Russia there is twice an 
evident one-day shift of data so that the data jumps to zero are followed by a peak due to the shift. This occurs also in France while in 
Germany there is a possible anticipation (due to ill-registration) of data. In other countries (Italy, Spain) this shift also occurs, but 
without the subsequent peaks. However, in many cases there are many variations that cannot be ascribed to data shifts, since they occur 
over many days. There is often an evident weekly pattern, although not always so regular to be ascribed to data collection. 





finally the geographic distribution. This model cannot be 
used to fit existing data, due to the great number of 
parameters (and the lack of an extensive investigation on 
them) but may be useful for visualizing some possible 
scenarios. 
 
2. Modelling epidemics 
 
Most of “classical” epidemics models are based on 
differential equations, but this approach has several “hidden” 
assumptions, so let us start from the very basics.  
     In principle, the most accurate model is that in which each 
individual in a real population is represented by an “agent” 
in the computer simulation. Clearly, we have to simplify 
drastically the representation of a person. First of all, we can 
assume that the state 𝑋𝑖 of an individual 𝑖 can assume a 
certain number of values, say susceptible (S), infected (I) 
and, if the disease confers immunity, recovery/refractory (R), 
i. e., the SIR model. Other common models include also an 
exposed/asymptomatic (E) state (SEIR model) and can 
distinguish between actual recovered people and dead ones 
(the SEIRD model).  
     Given these states, we have to specify the unit of time for 
which there can be a transition among states; it is quite 
natural to assume a time unit of one day, since the reports are 
issued on a daily base. We should then define the probability 
of the transition from one state to another, which can depend 
on the state of other people (as in the case of an infection), or 
on the previous state of the individual. For accurately 
modelling the infection phase, one could add intermediate 
steps, like 𝐼1, 𝐼2,… so that one can avoid the appearance of 
improbable recovering after a too short period.  
     For what concerns the infection phase, we should consider 
the network of contacts of individual 𝑖, which can be 
conveniently defined by a matrix 𝐴𝑖𝑗, which gives the 
probability of a daily contact between individual 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
Actually, the matrix needs not to be symmetric, since it 
expresses the modulation of infectivity of individual 𝑖 from 
individual 𝑗, and this depends on the precaution adopted. The 
matrix 𝐴𝑖𝑗 can replicate the fact that intimate (family) 
connections are stronger, followed by those among the own 
community, etc., and can also reflect the job or the age class 
of individual 𝑖, so that for instance a teacher or a physician 
(but also an adolescent) may have more (and more intense) 
contacts than a retired elder individual.  
     So, the simplest SIR model for one individual 𝑖 can be 
expressed as in Fig. 4, where [⋅] = 1 if ⋅ is true and zero 
otherwise, 𝛼 is the “bare” infection probability and  is the 
recovery probability. A healthy 𝑋𝑖  =  𝑆 individual has a 1 −
𝛼 probability to remain in its state following a contact with 
an infectious person (recovered ones do not convey any more 
the disease) and 𝛼 probability to be infected. If infected, 
he/she has 1 −  chance of remaining in the infected state 
and  of healing. 
     This model can be extended by adding more states, like 
asymptomatic exposed E, mild symptoms M, people in  
 
 
therapy T, dead individuals D, etc. One can also add age 
classes, so that susceptibles, for instance, can be in state 𝑆𝑘,  
where 𝑘 identifies the class, and can pass to state 𝐼𝑘 with 
probability proportional to 𝛼𝑘, etc.  
     Clearly, this model requires many parameters and is not 
susceptible by analytic treatment. So, before computers, 
scholars imposed a “mean-field” or “chemical” assumption, 
implying homogeneity and isotropy. With these assumptions, 
one can introduce the probability S of staying in state S 
(susceptible), 𝐼 of staying in state I (infective) and 𝑅 of staying 
in state R (Refractory), i.e., for a population of 𝑁 individuals, 






Indicating by 𝐾 the average connectivity  






one gets the following discrete-time equations (for the SIR 
model) 
 
   S(𝑡 + 1) = (1 − 𝛼𝐾𝐼(𝑡))𝑆(𝑡); 
   𝐼(𝑡 + 1) = (1 − )𝐼(𝑡) + 𝛼𝐾𝑆(𝑡)𝐼(𝑡); 
   𝑅(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝐼(𝑡); 
 
and 𝑆 + 𝑅 + 𝐼 = 1. Finally, assuming continuous time, one 
can convert the previous equations into differential ones.  
 
3. Our model 
 
The models are based on discrete states of individuals. In the 
first version (Fig. 5) we have 7 states, which correspond in 
principle to observable quantities:  
 
Figure 4. Simple agent-based SIR model 




S: susceptible;  
E: exposed (infectious but yet asymptomatic);  
A: asymptomatic (otherwise like E);  
M: mild symptoms;  
T: therapy (intensive);  
D: dead;  
R: recovered (heal); 
 
where 𝛼, 𝜖, 𝜇, 𝜏, 𝜉, 𝜌, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are the transition probabilities 
on a daily base, and 𝐾 is the average number of contacts per 
agent. In order to simplify a bit the model, and also due to 
the difficulties of detecting asymptomatic people, we can 
include them into the exposed, and fusing together the 
probabilities 𝜏 and 𝜉, getting the model-B of Fig. 5, so that 
we have 
 
𝜖 : probability of going from E to R (healing from 
asymptomatic state);  
𝜇 : probability of passing from E to M (inverse of the 
incubation time);  
𝜏 : probability of passing from M to T (aggravation);  
𝛿 : probability of passing from T to D (death);  
𝛾 : probability of going from T to R (healing with therapies);  
𝜌 : probability of recovery from mild symptoms. 
 
3.1 Estimation of the range of probabilities 
We have to estimate the daily probabilities, knowing that the 
average time ⟨𝑡⟩ is related to the probability 𝑝 by ⟨𝑡⟩  =  1/𝑝. 
Obviously ϵ is not known, but we have that 𝛼 =  1 −  𝜇𝜏.  
In the following, we shall extend the model to different 
classes of people, either based of their age or on their 
profession. 
     The probability of infection (transition 𝐸 → 𝐴) is given 
both by the fraction of infected (𝐸 and/or 𝑀, according with 
the class of people considered) and by the number of contacts 
per day (that can depend on the age class) 𝐾. 
     Given that 𝛼 is the probability of infection by one contact, 
indicating with 𝑋 the probability that a neighbor is infected, 
we have on average 𝐾𝑋 infected neighbors and therefore the 
probability of not becoming infected is (1 −  𝛼)𝐾𝑋 and that 




     If 𝐾 and 𝑋 are constant, the average time ⟨𝑡⟩ to contract the 
infection is ⟨𝑡⟩  =  1(𝛼𝐾𝑋) and therefore 𝛼 =  1(𝜏𝐾𝑋).  
     An infected individual surrounded by healthy people can 
infect in average 𝑛 ≃  𝛼𝐾 people per day (𝑛 ≃  (1 −
 𝑋)𝛼𝐾), so if the infectivity period (the quarantine) is 𝑄 ≃
 14 days is, roughly, 𝑛 ≃  𝛼𝐾𝑄. If 𝑛 is about 2.5 and taking 
for 𝐾 a value of about 𝐾 ≃  10, we have 𝛼 = ≃  0.2.  
     If we now combine the two formulas, assuming that 𝜏 ≃
 2, we have that the fraction of infected individuals (among 
those exposed) should be 𝑋 ≃  1(2𝑛) or approximately the 
20%.  
     Since the probability of remaining in state E is 
1 – (𝜖 +  𝜇), assuming that the incubation time is about 𝑤 =
 7 days, we have 𝜖 +  𝜇 =  1. The probability ϵ should be 
about the inverse of children’s recovery time, say 𝜖 ≃ 1/10. 
The incubation period is about 5 days, but this is not related 
to 1/𝜇, since this parameter is rather the probability of 
showing symptoms.  
     All probabilities are obviously positive and less or equal to 
one, and 
+ 𝜇 ≤ 1  
𝛾 +  𝛿 ≤  1 
(1) 
 
4. Mean-field equations 
 
     In the following we shall indicate with the same symbol 
(italic) the fraction of agents in a given state or, in for the 
stochastic version, the probability of finding an agent in such 
state. 
     The discrete-time equations, essentially equivalent to the 
Euler scheme for solving differential equations with 𝛥𝑡 =  1, 
are  
          
𝐸(𝑡 + 1)  =  (1− − 𝜇)𝐸(𝑡)  + 𝑆(𝑡)𝐾(𝐸(𝑡),𝑀(𝑡))𝑋(𝑡); 
𝑀(𝑡 + 1)  = (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜏)𝑀(𝑡) + 𝜇𝐸(𝑡); 
𝑇(𝑡 + 1)  = (1− 𝛿 − 𝛾)𝑇(𝑡) + 𝜏𝑀(𝑡);  
𝑅(𝑡 + 1)  = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝐸(𝑡) + 𝜌𝑀(𝑡) + 𝛾𝑇(𝑡); 
𝐷(𝑡 + 1)  = 𝐷(𝑡) + 𝛿𝑇(𝑡); 
𝑆(𝑡)  = 1 − (𝐸(𝑡) +𝑀(𝑡)  + 𝑇(𝑡)  +  𝑅(𝑡)  + 𝐷(𝑡)). 
                           
(2) 
The system is linear except for a quadratic nonlinearity in the 
first equation.  
     The quantity 𝐾(𝐸,𝑀) denotes the average number of 
contacts of an agent. In the following, we shall let 𝐾 decrease 
according to the restriction strategies and perception of the 
risk, i.e., on the fraction of infected or recovered people. The 
quantity 𝑋 denotes the probability of meeting infected people 
who can spread the disease, so either 𝑋 = 𝐸 or 𝑋 = 𝐸 +𝑀, 
according with the prevention measures applied to segregate 
manifestly infectious people. 
     All simulations start with a small fraction 𝐸(0) = 𝐸0 =
 10−6 of infected people.  
     Simulations show, as expected, the classic SIR behavior, 
with the number of susceptible people going to zero, people  
 
Figure 5. (left) Model-A, 7 states. (right) Model-B, 6 states 




in therapy showing a peak and the deaths reaching a certain 
final fraction of the population (Fig 6).  
     In the following we monitor the final fraction of deaths 
𝐷∞  =  0.125 and the maximal fraction of people in therapy 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑋  =  0.09, for the simulation of Fig. 6. These values 
applied to the world population would imply over 900 
million deaths and 675 million hospitalized. Applied to the 
Italian population they would mean 7.5 million dead and 5.4 
million hospitalized. 
 
5. Effects of restrictions and/or risk perception 
 
     Now let’s insert the effect of the restriction measures 
and/or the perception of the risk, modelled through the 
decrease of the connectivity K with the number of infected 
people E, or of people in therapy 𝑀.  
     We assume that the connectivity K is given by the sum of 
a fixed component K0 (family) and a variable term 𝐾𝑉, as  
𝐾(𝑌) =  𝐾0  + 𝐾𝑉 exp(−𝑐𝑌) (3) 
with a new parameter 𝑐. We assume that the connectivity 
decreases with the number showing mild symptoms (𝑌 =
𝑀(𝑡)), but with the increasing of sampling, it might depend 
on the number of detected asymptomatic (𝑌 = 𝐸(𝑡)). 
     By increasing c to 10, we observe a decrease in 
connectivity in correspondence with the peaks of people in 
therapy (Fig. 7-right), with a final fraction of deaths 𝐷∞ =
0.124 (almost unchanged), but a maximal fraction of people 
in therapy MMAX = 0.07, for the simulation of Fig. 7. 
     By further increasing 𝑐 (i.e., with much stronger 
restriction measures) and letting 𝐾𝑉  depend on 𝐸 (implying 
extended sampling of asymptomatic people), we get a 
smaller number of 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑋 = 0.02, at the cost of a longer 
emergence phase (the timescale is roughly six times in Fig. 8 
with respect to Fig. 6). The fraction of deaths has not changed  
much (𝐷∞  =  0.12) but now not all susceptible people got 
infected 𝑆∞ >  0 (Fig. 8). This is not the same as herd  
immunity, since the susceptible people can be re-infected 
once that 𝐾 has grown again. 
     
     Another interesting effect of the risk perception is that the 
curve of infected people, which in the SEIRD model shows an 
exponential growth and decrease (Fig. 9-left), with risk 
perception starts showing a different behavior (Fig. 9-right). 
 
6. Age classes 
 
     Different age classes have both different susceptibility, 
different contact patterns and, moreover, different 
probabilities of showing symptoms.  
     We start defining three age classes: young (0-25 y), middle 
age (25-65 y) and elders (> 65). From the census 2019 in Italy, 
we get that the respective percentages are 23%, 54% and 23% 
(21). All parameters now carry an index k, k = 1,2,3 for young, 
middle age and elder, resp.  
 
𝐸𝑘(𝑡 + 1)  = (1 − 𝑘 − 𝜇𝑘)𝐸𝑘(𝑡)  + 𝑆𝑘(𝑡)𝑋(𝑡); 
𝑀𝑘(𝑡 + 1)  = (1 − 𝜌𝑘 − 𝜏𝑘)𝑀𝑘(𝑡) + 𝜇𝑘𝐸𝑘(𝑡); 
𝑇𝑘(𝑡 + 1)  = (1 − 𝛿𝑘 − 𝛾𝑘)𝑇𝑘(𝑡) + 𝜏𝑘𝑀𝑘(𝑡);               (4) 
𝑅𝑘(𝑡 + 1)  = 𝑅𝑘(𝑡) + 𝑘𝐸𝑘(𝑡) + 𝜌𝑘𝑀𝑘(𝑡) + 𝛾𝑘𝑇𝑘(𝑡);     
𝐷𝑘(𝑡 + 1)  = 𝐷𝑘(𝑡) + 𝛿𝑘𝑇𝑘(𝑡); 
𝑆𝑘(𝑡)  = 1 − (𝑅𝑘(𝑡)  +𝑀𝑘(𝑡)  + 𝑇𝑘(𝑡) + 𝑅𝑘(𝑡)  + 𝐷𝑘(𝑡)), 
 
The equations are coupled by the fraction of infected people 
𝑋(𝑡) 
   𝑋(𝑡) =  ∑𝐾𝑘(𝑡)𝐸𝑘(𝑡)
𝑘
. 
For beginning, we used the set of parameters of Table 1 
 
Table 1. set of parameters of the age-class model of Eq. (4). 
parameter young middle age elders 
α  0.02  0.02  0.02  
ϵ  0.1  0.01  0.001 
μ  0.0  0.01  0.1  
τ  0.0  0.01  0.1  
δ  0.0  0.001  0.01 
γ  0.0  0.001  0.02  
ρ  0.01  0.01  0.01  
KV  20  20  4  
K0  2  2  1  
c  c0  c0  c0  
 
As expected, with a small value of c0 = 1, little changes for 
the total values (although not all susceptibles now get 
infected), but the distribution for the different age classes are 
obviously different (and the most of infected came from 
middle age), Fig. 10. However, even for limited risk 
perception, the number of deaths seems to follow a curve 
similar to a power-law, as in real data (19). The final fraction 
of deaths is D∞≃ 0.067 and the maximum fraction of people 
in therapy is MMAX≃ 0.08.  
     For larger values of c0 (100), as in the previous case the 
epidemics lasts longer, but the numbers MMAX≃ 0.017 and 
D∞≃ 0.059 lower, and the fraction of susceptibles who do not 
get infected increases, see Fig. 11. 



















Figure 6. Simple SEIR model, 𝐾 =  22, 𝛼 =  0.02, 𝜖 =
 0.1, 𝜇 =  0.1, 𝜏 =  𝛿 =  𝛾 =  𝜌 =  0.01. Here and in the 
following figures, time is in days (iterations). 







Figure 8. SEIR model with risk perception, 𝑐 =  100, other parameters as in Fig 7. Left: time plot of observables Eq. (2), right: 
time plot of connectivity 𝐾(𝑡), Eq. (3) 
Figure 9. Plots in a log-lin scale. (left) fraction of M people without risk perception (𝑐 =  0); (right) fraction of M people with 
extreme risk perception 𝑐 =  1000, other parameters as in Fig 7 
Figure 10. 𝑐0  =  1, other parameters as in Table 1. (top left) total fractions; (top right) infected for different age classes; (bottom 
left) people in therapy; (bottom right) deaths on a log-log scale. 






7. Social groups model 
 
     The main goal of restriction measures is that of stopping 
the epidemics before it reaches all the country. In order to 
model it, we need to introduce a spatial model. Let us denote 
by Aij the probability of contact between individuals i and j. 
The contact needs not to be symmetric, since the 
transmission of the disease depends on the precautions taken. 
We consider a hierarchical network (22), of the type of Fig. 
12-left. It is defined by a block matrix 𝐼 of the type of Fig. 
11-right. The index matrix 𝐼 defines the parameters of the 
matrix 𝐴: 𝐴𝑖𝑗 =  1 with a certain probability 𝑝(𝐼𝑖𝑗) such that 
the average number of contacts of an individual in 
community 𝑛 is 𝐾(𝑛).  
     The index matrix 𝐼 is defined by the size 𝐿 of the blocks, 
in the example of Fig. 12 they are 𝐿(1)  =  2, 𝐿(2)  =
 3, 𝐿(3)  =  2 (the size of the smallest community is 2, the 
following one is composed by 3 smaller communities, and  
 
 
the whole system is composed by 2 intermediate 
communities). One can think of families, cities and country.  
     The number of connections may change from individual to 
individual, when chosen with the realization of the stochastic 
choice of connections with probability 𝑝(𝑛), as in Fig. 12-left, 
but for simulations it is faster to keep 𝐾𝑛 fixed and choose this 
number of individual at random among the given community. 
The random choice is repeated in each time step (annealed 
version) or may be kept fixed (quenched version). The 
annealed version assures that there is no isolated community, 
a case that may happen in the quenched version for low 
connectivity. In the following we use the annealed version.  
     The matrix 𝐴 is generated according to 𝐼 and 𝑝’s at each 
time step (annealed), and actually in simulations we do not 
have any matrix, just the probability of connections that are 
translated into the number of contacts in each community, 
randomly chosen.  
     The equations are the same, but now the connection 𝐾 is 
split into that of the different communities, and also the 
infection rate α depends on the community 𝑛, so we have now  
Figure 11. 𝑐0  =  100, other parameters as in Table 1. (top left) total fractions; (top right) infected for different age classes; 
(bottom left) people in therapy; (bottom right) deaths on a log-log scale. 
Figure 12. (left) Index of a hierarchical network with three-community sizes 𝐿 = {2,3,2}. (right) A realization of a 
network with 𝐿 = {6,4,4} and connection probability 𝑝 = {1,0.04,0.002}. 





a real agent-based model (for the moment without age 
structure).  
     Let us consider for the moment a simple model with four 
states: S, E, R and D (SERD) and three parameters: 𝛼(𝑛) , 
infection probability from infected people in community 𝑛, 𝜌, 
recovery rate and 𝛿, death rate.  












𝑆𝑖 otherwise;                                                                    
                                                                   
 
𝐸𝑖 → {
𝑅𝑖 with probability  𝜌;
𝑆𝑖 with probability 𝛿;
𝐸𝑖 otherwise;                
                                      (5) 
𝑅𝑖 → 𝑅𝑖; 
𝐷𝑖 → 𝐷𝑖;  
 
where 𝑗(𝑚) indicates and individual at random in 
community 𝑚, 𝑄𝑗(𝑚)∈𝐿(𝑛)  is its state and again [⋅] is one if ⋅ 
is true and zero otherwise.  
     Let us consider for instance the case 𝐿 =  {4,10,20} (800 
individuals), 𝐾 =  {4,2,1} and 𝛼 =  {0.8,0.01,0.001}, see  
 
 
Fig. 13 and 14-left.  
     As expected, we see a quick propagation inside a first-level 
community, followed by sporadic breakdown in other 
communities, Fig. 13.  
     The infection curve starts to assume the saw-tooth 
appearance of those coming from actual data, Fig. 3 and all 
curved show sudden jumps, Fig. 14-left. If we allow the 
contacts among communities only during workdays 
(increasing the inter-community infectivity 𝛼 =
 {0.8,0.05,0.003}), we get a more marked pattern, fig. 14-
right. 
 
8. Improvements and perspectives 
 
     The models here presented constitute just the first 
approximations to the problem. First of all, we are developing 
the spatial model with age classes, and implementing a more 
real network structure, with quenched and annealed parts, 
representing the connections that are stable (family, school, 
some kind of work) and those that are variable (casual 
contacts, commerce, travels). In this way one can simulate 
with more efficacy the effects of restrictions and the 
perspective of reopening. Clearly, these improvements come  
Figure 13. A snapshot of the status of the network. Bottom line denotes susceptible individuals (blue marks infected or 
recovered or died), middle lines are infected (light green marks), top line represents deaths (red marks). 
Figure 14. (left) Saw-tooth behavior of infection curve. (right) More pronounced behavior with infection limited to 
workdays. 





at the cost of increasing the number of parameters, which are 
quite difficult to estimate from field data (often missing and 




     We have presented some basic simulation scenarios for an 
infectious disease inspired by the observed characteristics of 
Covid-19. We started with the “classical” mean-field 
approach based on time-discrete equations, introducing the 
risk perception effects by means of the restrictions of 
contacts, and age classes, showing that in this case the overall 
growth of deaths (and of other quantities) is no more an 
exponential, but shows a power-law like behavior.  
     We then introduced an agent-based model, limited to the 
standard infection case (without age classes and risk 
perception) showing that the network of contacts organized 
in communities is a crucial ingredient for reproducing the 
observed saw-tooth behavior and sudden outbreaks.  
     Further work is ongoing for developing a unified model, 
with the goals of furnishing a tool for interpreting the 
observed scenarios, without any presumption of fitting 
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